Optimal Trade Policy, Foreign Ownership and Corporate Control  by Lin, Yen-Ju
 Procedia Economics and Finance  5 ( 2013 )  488 – 493 
2212-5671 © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Organising Committee of ICOAE 2013
doi: 10.1016/S2212-5671(13)00057-9 
International Conference on Applied Economics (ICOAE) 2013 
Optimal trade policy, foreign ownership and corporate control 
 
Yen-Ju Lin * 
Department of Future Studies and LOHAS, Fo Guang University, No.160, Linwei Rd., Jiaosi, Yilan County 26247, Taiwan 
 
Abstract 
This paper constructs a two-country, three-firm trade model with a two-stage game to explore the unilateral 
optimal export policy under Cournot competition, when the domestic export firm undertakes Cross-border 
ownership. We find that the optimal export policy is subsidy when domestic multinational does not has 
control of a local firm through partial ownership. However, the optimal export policy of the domestic country 
is to levy a tax when domestic multinational has control of a local firm. Moreover, the optimal export policy 
is free trade if there is no foreign ownership regulation possessed by foreign country. 
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1. Introduction 
Cross-border ownership (CBO) is widely observed. Often, multinationals undertake foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in order to control local firms, in addition to selling to the local market via exports. For 
example, the French company Renault is a partial shareholder of Nissan in Japan, in addition to exporting to 
Japan. Moreover, all world leading automakers have been investing in China and simultaneously exporting 
there. Given this background, the present paper explores the unilateral optimal export policy when exports 
and FDI coexist, in an oligopoly model of three firms. 
Since the 1980, the strategic trade theory has been flourished. Brander and Spencer, 1985 find that optimal 
unilateral export policy is subsidy, when firms produce homogeneous products under Cournot competition. 
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Eaton and Grossman, 1986 consider general model and take horizontal product differentiation into their 
model to explore the optimal unilateral export policy under Cournot or Bertrand competition. They also find 
that the optimal export policy is subsidy under Cournot competition in the presence of horizontal 
differentiation. Although there are great achievements from these literatures, they only focus on the optimal 
export policy without exporting and FDI coexist. Ishikawa et al., 2011 only consider the commercial policy. 
Taking this into account, we specifically focus on the optimal trade policy under the case in which the export 
firm may have control of a foreign local firm through partial ownership. 
There are a number of studies that analyze commercial policies under CBO in the framework of 
international oligopoly (see Lee, 1990; Long and Soubeyran, 2001). However, they assume that the 
subsidiaries only maximize their own profits and ignore the headquarter interest is related to those of the 
subsidiaries. Therefore, this paper takes corporate control rights into the model. We find that the corporate 
control rights play a key role in affecting the optimal export policy. We find that the optimal export policy of 
the domestic country is to levy a tax when domestic multinational has control of a local firm. Moreover, the 
optimal export policy is free trade if there is no foreign ownership regulation possessed by foreign country. 
 
2. The model 
Consider good X is made by a domestic firm d, it exports to the foreign market. In the foreign country, 
there are two local firms 1 and 2, they produce and sell good Y locally. Moreover, goods X and Y are 
imperfectly substituted. We assume firm d holds firm 1’s stocks, by a share k which is exogenously give and 0 
< k d 1. We assume that the cost of acquiring the share k is treated as a past sunk cost. We also regard k as a 
foreign ownership regulation possessed by foreign country. It implies that the ownership regulation imposed 
by foreign government is wider if k is larger. We assume the three firms have same constant marginal costs c 
and compete in the Cournot fashion in the foreign market. 
The domestic government imposes a unilateral export subsidy s on the exported good X. We assume for 
simplicity that a change in the subsidy does not affect the ownership ratio, k.  
The inverse demands for goods X and Y are given respectively as: 
),(1 21 yyrxpx                                                                                                                                (1.1) 
,)(1 21 rxyypy                                                                                                                               (1.2) 
where pd and py are the prices of goods X and Y. The parameter J  indicates the degree of substitutability. x, y1, 
and y2 are the outputs of firm i respectively ( i = x, 1, 2). The profits of the three firms can be written 
respectively as: 
,)( 1SS kxscpxd                                                                                                                           (2.1) 
where Sdd { (px – c –t + s) x is the profit earned by selling good X, which also obtains a share k of the profits of 
firm 1. 
,)( 11 ycpy  S                                                                                                                                           (2.2) 
.)( 22 ycpy  S                                                                                                                                          (2.3) 
The following sections examine the effects of ownership regulation imposed by foreign government on 
export subsidy, by explicitly taking corporate control into account. We model financial interests and corporate 
control in a simple way. The firm d with the higher financial interest takes total control of firm 1. It implies 
that firm d determines the firm1’s output. Since there are two cases, which are 0 d  k < 1/2 and 1/2 d k d 1, 
respectively. We shall investigate these two cases sequentially in the following sections. 
   The game has two stages. In the first stage, taking the foreign ownership k as given, the domestic 
government determines the optimal export subsidy. In the second stage, firms compete in a Cournot fashion in 
the foreign market. The game is solved by backward induction. 
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3. Cournot competition 
There are three firms d, 1 and 2 in the foreign market. The firm holding corporate control determines the 
output of firm 1, that is, it is firm 1 if 0 d k < 1/2 and firm d if 1/2 d k d 1. Therefore, firm 1 maximizes Sd 
under full control by firm d, and firms d and 2 maximize their own profits simultaneously and independently, 
giving rise to the following set of first-order conditions: 
,0)1(2)/( 21   ww syykxaxd JJS                                                                                                (3.1) 
,021)/( 2122   ww yyxy JS                                                                                                                (3.2) 
The first-order conditions of firm 1 under 0 d k <1/2 and 1/2 d k d 1are given respectively as: 
),2/1(0                    ,021)/( 2111 d  ww kifyyxy JS                                                                      (3.3) 
,1)2/1(  ,0)2)(11()/( 211 dd  ww kifyyxkyd KJS                                                                       (3.4) 
where K { 1/k t 1 is an index of firm d’s control over firm 1 per ownership. 
Now, we analyze the effects of export subsidy on outputs of all firms when 0 d k < 1/2. Solving (3.1)-(3,3), 
we can have equilibrium outputs for all firms. Then, we can have the effects of subsidy s on outputs: 
,0)/3()/( !' ww ncsx                                                                                                                                   (4.1) 
,0)/()/,()/( 21 ' ww ww ncsysy J                                                                                                           (4.2) 
where 'nc = 6-J2(2+k) > 0 and the superscript “nc” indicates the case of without having firm 1’s corporate 
control right by firm d, which is 0 d k <1/2. 
From (4), it is straightforward to know that a higher export subsidy increases the exportation of firm d and 
decrease the output of local firms. 
If domestic firm d has foreign local firm 1’s corporate control rights, which is 1/2 d k d 1, the effects of 
export subsidy on outputs of all firms are as following. Solving (3.1)-(3.2) and (3.4), we can have equilibrium 
outputs for all firms and then have the effects of subsidy on outputs: 
,0)/3()/( !' ww csx                                                                                                                                     (5.1) 
,0/)21()/( 1 ' ww csy KJ                                                                                                                       (5.2) 
,0/)1()/( 2 t' ww csy KJ                                                                                                                           (5.3) 
where 'c = 6 -J2(4+k+K) > 0 and the superscript “c” indicates the case of having firm 1’s corporate control 
right by firm d. 
From (5), we find that the effects of subsidy on the output of independent foreign firm 2 under this case are 
different from that under 0 d k < 1/2. It is surprising that a subsidy on domestic export firm d could enlarge 
the output of the independent foreign firm 2 when firm d has firm 1’s corporate control rights. The results 
arise because that corporate control enables firm d to shift production from firm 1 to exports for grabbing the 
export subsidy. Therefore, the independent foreign firm 2 can increase its output if the decrease in y1 is 
sufficiently larger than the increase in x. Summarizing the above analysis, we obtain the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. If domestic export firm does not have local foreign firm 1’s corporate control rights, an 
increase in the export subsidy on good X decreases local foreign independent firm 2’s output. However, if 
domestic export firm has local foreign firm 1’s corporate control rights, an increase in the export subsidy on 
good X increases local foreign independent firm 2’s output. 
 
4. Optimal trade policy 
4.1 If domestic firm d do not have foreign local firm 1’s corporate control rights 
We now proceed to discuss the optimal trade policy of domestic country. Under this stage, the domestic 
government maximizes its welfare to determine the optimal export subsidy. The social welfare of domestic 
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country consists of the profits of firm d and export subsidy, which is Wd { (x, y1, y2, s) –sx(s). Total 
differentiating Wd with export subsidy s, we can have: 
,0)/()/~()]/)(/~()/)(/~[()/( 2211  wwwwwwwwwwww ww sxsxssyysyysW dddd SSS                             (6) 
where dS~ { Sd (x(s), y(s), s). 
    The square bracket in the right-hand side of (6), whose value is non-negative, is named the rent-shifting 
effect. From (1), (2.1) and (4), we can have  [(w dS~ /wy1)(wy1/ws)+(w dS~ /wy2)(wy2/ws)] = (Jk/'nc)(2KJx +y1) > 0. 
The intuition is, a higher subsidy reduces the output of local firms and that increases the profits of firm d. 
Therefore, this effect leads domestic government to raise the export subsidy. The second term in the right-
hand side of (6), whose value is non-negative, is named the quantity effect. From (1) and (2.1), we can have 
(w dS~ /ws) { x > 0. The intuition is, a higher subsidy increases the exportation of firm d and therefore increases 
the profits of firm d. The last term in the right-hand side of (6), whose value is non-positive, is named the 
subsidy expenditure effect. It arises because that a higher subsidy lowers the welfare. 
From (6), we can have the optimal export subsidy of domestic government as: 
},)/~()]/)(/~()/)(/~){[(/1( 2211
* xssyysyys ddd
ncnc wwwwwwwwww/ SSS                                               (7) 
where /nc { (wx/ws) { (3/ 'nc) > 0. 
   From (7), we find that the optimal export policy is determined by rent-shifting effect, quantity effect and 
subsidy expenditure effect. Arranging (7), we can have snc* { (J/3)(2Jx+ky1) > 0. Therefore, the optimal export 
policy for domestic government is to subsidize its domestic firm d if firm d do not have foreign local firm 1’s 
corporate control rights. 
Now, we investigate the effects of a wider ownership regulation on export subsidy. Differentiating snc* with 
respect to k, we can have: 
].3/)86([)]/()/(2)[3/()/( 2111
ncydkdykydkdxks '  ww JJJJ                                                      (8) 
Total Differentiating (3.1)-(3.3), we find that (dx/dk) = (-3Jy1)/ 'nc < 0 and (dy1/dk) = (J2y1)/ 'nc > 0, then 
substituting these into (6), we find that (ws/wk) d (>) 0 if J t (<) 3 /2. A wider foreign ownership regulation, 
i.e., a larger k, indicates that firm d can grab more profits from foreign local firm 1. Therefore, it will lead 
firm d to reduce its exportation in order to increase the output of foreign local firm 1. However, firm d’s 
exportation will reduce too much if the two goods are more substituted. Otherwise, it will reduce less if the 
two goods are less substituted. Therefore, a wider foreign ownership regulation will lead a lower (higher) 
subsidy if the two goods are more substituted (less substituted). According to the above discussion, we can 
have proposition 2 as following: 
 
Proposition 2. If domestic multinational d has foreign local firm’s partial ownership but does not have 
corporate control rights, then the optimal export policy is export subsidy. Moreover, a wider foreign 
ownership regulation lowers (raises) the optimal rate of subsidy if the two goods are more substituted (less 
substituted), i.e., J t (<) 3 /2. 
 
   Under the case in which the domestic multinational d does not have corporate control rights, the results are 
similar to Eaton and Grossman, 1986. The optimal export policy is subsidy under Cournot competition in the 
presence of horizontal differentiation.  However, we find that the optimal rate of subsidy will be lower if x 
and y are more substituted. Otherwise, it will be higher if two goods are less substituted. 
 
4.2 If domestic firm d has foreign local firm 1’s corporate control rights 
In this section, we discuss the optimal export policy of domestic government if domestic firm d has foreign 
local firm 1’s corporate control rights. Total differentiating Wd with export subsidy s, we can have the first-
order condition as: 
.0)/()/~()/)(/~()/( 22  wwwwwwww ww sxsxssyysW ddd SS                                                                  (9) 
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It is worth to note that the first term in the bracket in the right-hand side of (6), i.e., (w dS~ /wy1)(wy1/ws), will 
vanish when firm d has foreign local firm 1’s corporate control rights. Therefore, we have (9) and we also can 
have the optimal export subsidy of domestic government as: 
].)/~()/)(/~)[(/1( 22
* xssyys dd
cc wwwwww/ SS                                                                                       (10) 
where /c { (wx/ws) { (3/'c) > 0. 
   From (10), we find that the quantity effect and subsidy expenditure effect are as same as those in (7). 
According to (1), (2.1) and (5), we can have (w dS~ /wy2)(wy2/ws) = [-J(K-1)/'c](Jx+ky1) < 0. It indicates that the 
rent-shifting effect becomes negative when domestic firm d has foreign local firm 1’s corporate control rights. 
The result arises because domestic firm d already can adjust the outputs of foreign local firm 1 via having 
corporate control. So, the purpose of rent shifting from foreign local independent firm via export subsidizing 
is the only consideration. However, a higher subsidy leads domestic firm d to shift production from it foreign 
owned firm to exports a lot and leads more output of foreign local independent firm (i.e., firm 2). That causes 
lower profits of firm d and more subsidies expenditure. Eventually, it induces lower the welfare. Therefore, 
the domestic government intends to lower subsidy for raising the profits of firm d and welfare when firm d 
has foreign local firm 1’s corporate control rights.  
  Arranging (10), we can obtain sc*{ (-1/3)[ [J2(K-1)x + J (1-k)y1] < 0. It implies that the optimal export policy 
of domestic government is to tax on its exportation due to negative rent-shifting effect. Summarizing the 
above discussion, we obtain the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. If domestic multinational d has foreign local firm’s partial ownership and corporate control 
rights, the optimal export policy of domestic government is export tariff. 
 
Comparing our result with export subsidy as derived by Eaton and Grossman, 1986, we find that the optimal 
export policy is to levy a tax when we take corporate control rights into account. It arises because that the 
domestic firm d already can adjust the outputs of foreign owned firm 1 to maximize its total profits via having 
corporate control rights. Therefore, the export subsidy only impacts the foreign local independent firm 2. 
However, export subsidy leads the foreign local independent firm more active. Contrary to the intention of 
domestic government, subsidy harms its domestic firm.  
 
  Then, we investigate the effects of a wilder ownership regulation on export subsidy. Differentiating snc* with 
respect to k, we can have: 
 },)1)(/(])/[(){3/()/( 11 ykdkdyxdkdxks JKKJ  ww                                                                         (11) 
 }2)1(]1)7/4()[9/7){(1)(1(9  22222 kkkkc  JJJI , 
where I { 1/[2(J2+J2k2+7J2k-9k)2] > 0. 
We find that the brace of (11) (i.e., (7J2/9) [k2+(4/7)k+1] -J(1-k2)-2k2 ) is negative as 0 < J < 1. So, we have 
(ws/wk) > 0, It implies that a wider ownership regulation leads a smaller export tariff. The intuition is, a larger 
k indicates that the domestic firm d can extract more profits from the foreign local firm 1 through having firm 
1’s ownership. So, the domestic multinational d will shift more production from exports to its foreign owned 
in order to evade the burden of the export tariff when k is larger. Therefore, a wider foreign ownership 
regulation lowers the optimal rate of tariff. Moreover, substituting k = 1 into sc*, it is intelligible to find that 
sc*= 0. It implies that the optimal export policy is free trade when there is no foreign ownership regulation on 
foreign country.  
Summarizing the above discussion, we can have: 
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Proposition 4. If domestic multinational d has foreign local firm 1’s partial ownership and corporate control 
rights, a wider foreign ownership regulation will lead a lower export tariff. However, the optimal export trade 
policy is free trade (s = 0) if there is no ownership regulation on foreign country, that is k = 1. 
 
  There is an important implication provided from Proposition 4. The optimal export policy becomes a 
tariff when we take corporate control rights into our model even in the presence of product differentiation. 
Moreover, the optimal export tariff is related to the degree of the foreign ownership regulation in foreign 
country. The wider foreign ownership regulation in foreign country, the lower will be the export tariff. 
Furthermore, the optimal export policy is free trade as the foreign country does not regulate the foreign 
ownership. Huck and Konrad, 2004, employ the model of Brander and Spencer, 1985 and consider the 
welfare effects of merger in a strategic trade policy environment.  They assume that domestic country has one 
firm and foreign country has two firms, the firms all export and sell their products to the third country. The 
two countries have export policy to their firm respectively. They show that the optimal export policy is free 
trade when the country has two export firms.  Our result is similar to that obtained in Huck and Konrad, 2004. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has developed a model to investigate the optimal trade policy when exports and FDI coexists. 
We find that the partial ownership and corporate control rights play a key role on the optimal trade policy of 
export country. We show that an increase in the export subsidy may increase the foreign local independent 
firm’s outputs if domestic export firm has the foreign local firm’s corporate control rights. Respecting the 
strategic trade policy, when domestic multinational does not have control of a foreign local firm through 
partial ownership, the optimal export policy is subsidy. A wider foreign ownership regulation in foreign 
country lowers (raises) the optimal rate of subsidy if the two goods are more substituted (less substituted). 
However, the optimal export policy of the domestic country is to levy a tax when the domestic multinational 
has control of foreign local firm. A wider foreign ownership regulation leads a lower export tariff. Moreover, 
the optimal export policy is free trade if there is no foreign ownership regulation possessed by foreign country. 
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